Preparedness in an Age of Uncertainty

Britain is not as prepared as it needs to be. In an era the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy describes as one of “radical uncertainty”, the threats we face are multiplying and our approach to resilience has not kept pace.

This is not an issue confined to strategic papers in Whitehall. It is already shaping the daily lives of our constituents, often in quiet, cumulative ways.

A recent experience in my own constituency illustrates this all too clearly. During Storm Éowyn in January 2025, thousands of homes lost power for days in the depths of winter. People were left without heating, without reliable communication and, in some cases, without access to essential medical equipment. The response from energy companies, emergency services and community groups was committed and tireless. But when the system was placed under real strain, its weaknesses became evident.

Plans existed but were untested. In some cases, they were worryingly out of date. In others, those responsible for implementing them had moved on. In High Valleyfield, a local resilience plan still pointed to a community centre as a hub for support, yet no one knew who held the keys. The community ultimately took matters into its own hands.

That experience highlighted that preparedness is not about having plans on paper. It is about whether those plans work when they are needed most.

The nature of the threats we face have changed profoundly. Today’s risks are broader, more interconnected and often less visible. Cyber-attacks, infrastructure sabotage, and climate-related events do not occur in isolation. They overlap, compound and evolve.

Crucially, their impacts are often gradual rather than sudden. A cyber disruption can ripple through supply chains. A geopolitical shock can drive up energy prices and household bills. A climate event can cascade into infrastructure failure. Our adversaries can exploit these waves of disruption. In fact, they already do.

This demands a shift in how we think about preparedness.

One underappreciated principle can guide us here, Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Often overshadowed by NATO’s collective defence commitments, it places a duty on nations to develop capacity to resist attack through “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid”. In today’s world, “attack” must be understood in a much broader sense.

Preparedness, therefore, cannot sit within a single department or policy area. Yet too often, coordination remains fragmented.

Take energy resilience. Without a secure and reliable energy system, modern society cannot function. Hospitals rely on it. Communications networks depend on it. Supply chains are built around it. We have seen how energy can be weaponised abroad. It would be naïve to assume such tactics could not be directed at the UK. Once again, they already are. Yet grey areas remain, particularly around how we respond to hybrid attacks on offshore infrastructure, and how departments such as the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence and Department for Energy Security and Net Zero coordinate responsibilities.

Equally concerning is the resilience of the technologies embedded in our systems. In discussions around potential vulnerabilities in imported components, I have encountered a worrying tendency to dismiss risks as “theoretical”. But most risks are theoretical, until they become real. Real preparedness demands we take plausible threats seriously before they materialise.

Finally, there is the role of the public. Preparedness cannot be delivered by government alone. It depends on trust, understanding and participation. That requires a more open conversation with the public about the risks we face.

For too long, there has been a tendency to withhold information for fear of causing alarm. In an age of uncertainty, that approach is no longer sustainable. We should be less concerned about frightening people and more concerned about losing their trust by hiding the truth.

An informed public is a resilient public. Clear information, practical guidance and shared responsibility are essential. Without them, we risk undermining preparedness and the public support needed to sustain the long-term investment resilience requires.

Preparedness for national emergencies is not a single policy or programme. It is a system, and a mindset. Because when the next crisis comes, the test will not be whether plans existed. It will be whether they worked, whether they were understood, and whether our communities were truly ready.