Persuasion versus coercion—a unique narrative which Harris and Trump, respectively, have opted to pursue and craft.
Every four years, the world’s fate in relation to policy, trade, and diplomacy is decided. This year is no different. As first-world countries clamber to remain in the spotlight, third-world countries have historically been regarded as less significant in the grand scheme of things.
In fact, according to U.S. News, the superpowers that stand to gain (or lose) the most from the U.S election are the United States, China and Russia.
At the opposite end of the world, South Africa is a country that is no stranger to mercurial façade-imposed diplomacy. Having held its own elections this year—in which the ANC secured 40.18% of the vote, the DA secured 21.81%, the MK party secured 14.58%, and Cyril Ramaphosa was re-elected as President of South Africa—South Africa may have foreshadowed the tumultuous roller-coaster the U.S Presidential election has turned out to be thus far.
The overall 2024 election cycle (including all races) has cost $15.9 billion, exceeding the previous record of $15.1 billion spent in 2020. When it comes to the presidential race, the Harris campaign has spent $1+ billion compared to $380+ million for the Trump campaign, while super PACs and other outside groups have spent ~$1.3 billion.
Broader African Impact
From an African perspective, Trump’s administration would likely focus on boosting U.S. business investments in Africa by removing regulatory barriers and creating more favourable conditions for American companies. Trump’s business background suggests that he might pursue deals that prioritize immediate returns, such as resource extraction and infrastructure projects, with clear benefits to U.S. firms.
His administration would likely support more private sector investments and fewer governmental aid programs, aligning with the belief that private capital and bilateral agreements will drive faster growth. This might benefit resource-rich countries and those with strong regulatory environments but risks leaving smaller economies, or those without significant resources, at a disadvantage.
Trump’s approach to trade, favouring bilateral deals over multilateral agreements, could have mixed consequences in Africa. Bilateral agreements often favour a stronger partner, meaning that African nations might struggle to secure equitable terms. However, the Trump administration has generally supported the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a key policy that has facilitated African exports to U.S. markets for two decades. If reauthorized in 2025, the AGOA could offer African economies continued access to the U.S. market.
On the other hand, if Vice President Kamala Harris becomes the president, her administration could bring a more inclusive and sustainable development approach to U.S.-Africa relations. Building on the Biden administration’s emphasis on human rights, anti-corruption and capacity building, Harris may support initiatives that go beyond short-term economic gains. In remarks reflecting on her 2023 visit to Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia, Harris spoke about the power of partnership with African countries and the significant investment opportunities they offer, such as those in culture, music, and arts. Harris could use the power of the presidency to build on President Joe Biden’s 2022 executive order, supporting African culture, creative industries, and digital innovation to strengthen economic growth and prosperity in Africa. Furthermore, Harris could leverage the “Prosper Africa” initiative, aimed at increasing two-way trade and investment, and strengthen U.S. support for small African enterprises, potentially offering African countries more control over their own economic futures.
Security collaboration remains a cornerstone of U.S.-Africa relations, particularly given the ongoing terrorist threats in regions such as the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa. A Trump administration could potentially intensify U.S. counterterrorism activities, emphasizing robust military engagement through the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).
This approach could lead to a rapid bolstering of African governments’ abilities to confront extremist groups, potentially providing short-term security gains. However, a militarized approach risks side-lining the root causes of instability, such as poverty, corruption and lack of economic opportunities, particularly for young people. Without significant investments in socio-economic solutions and institutional capacity-building, security gains may remain superficial and unsustainable, potentially increasing the dependency on external forces for long-term stability.
In contrast, Harris might prioritize a capacity-building approach that could strengthen African institutions to lead their own security efforts. A Harris administration is likely to invest in governance reforms, local law enforcement and support for the African Union and regional organizations to coordinate security strategies.
By emphasizing institution-building and regional partnerships, Harris could pave the way for a more resilient and autonomous African security framework that reduces dependency on U.S. support. However, her administration would also need to address the complexities of counterterrorism strategies, particularly in the face of increasingly sophisticated threats from groups such as Boko Haram, al-Shabab and Daesh-affiliated organizations.
Trade is another key area in which analysts think Harris and Trump would differ, given Trump’s “America first” policy. African governments hope that next year the U.S. will renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a Clinton-era policy that gives countries duty-free access to the U.S. market.
Ray Hartley, research director of South African Brenthurst Foundation think tank, added, “I think that a Trump presidency would reinforce America’s isolationist approach in international affairs, and that might not be good for trade.”
Other analysts said they believe general U.S. policy toward Africa won’t differ radically regardless of who wins. They said that while Africa was often neglected in terms of U.S. foreign policy, that has shifted in recent years amid renewed competition with Russia and China on the resource-rich continent.
Despite promises from the Biden administration to elevate the collective voices of Africans in global decision making and institutions, the White House has continued to fall short of its rhetoric. Africans still hold no seat at the UN Security Council, two years after Biden first agreed to it, while the U.S.-led response to climate change, development finance, and great power competition all seem to continue to favour the Global North.
Although, a Harris administration could stay faithful to Biden’s U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, released in 2022, which seeks to elevate Africa’s voice in global institutions and in U.S. decision making on policy matters that affect the continent directly.
Meanwhile, the Trump shadow policy doctrine, Project 2025, seemingly lifts entire elements of Biden’s same Africa strategy, arguing, for example, that Africa’s “explosive population growth, large reserves of industry-dependent minerals, proximity to key maritime shipping routes, and its collective diplomatic power ensure the continent’s global importance.” This suggests that the Trump team recognizes Africa’s long-term strategic importance, just as much as Biden did.
Impact on South Africa
Trump has emphasised tariffs and trade barriers to shield U.S. industries from foreign competition. If re-elected, Trump confirmed that he would reinstate and increase tariffs on imports, reducing demand for exports from South Africa and other emerging markets. His push to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign manufacturing could further weaken demand for South African goods, impacting industries that rely on access to U.S. markets. Trump may also seek to renegotiate or withdraw from trade agreements, potentially weakening South Africa’s trade relationship with the U.S. and making it more vulnerable to global commodity price volatility.
Contrastingly, Harris may focus on strengthening ties with organisations like the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and African Union. This would create a more stable trade environment for emerging markets, including South Africa, where exporters may gain better access to the U.S. market without the looming threat of tariffs. As previously mentioned, Harris might also expand programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which offers African countries duty-free access to U.S. markets. With South Africa as a significant AGOA beneficiary, extending this program would provide opportunities to increase exports and strengthen its trade balance, which could lead to a stronger Rand.
Trump has previously pressured the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates to stimulate the U.S. economy. This strategy could channel capital flows to higher-yielding emerging markets like South Africa. However, his other policies may result in a stronger U.S. dollar, which could pressure the South African Rand.
Harris would not directly control Federal Reserve policy. Her administration is expected to support a stable and independent Federal Reserve, prioritising long-term financial stability over short-term economic stimulus. This could benefit emerging markets by maintaining steady interest rate policies, enabling economies like South Africa to plan for capital flows with less volatility. Harris’s approach might also avoid aggressive fiscal policies that could overly strengthen the dollar, helping to stabilise the Rand and reducing inflationary pressures on imports and dollar-denominated debt.
Trump is known for his steadfast stance on foreign relations. His policies could heighten tensions with major global players like China. Given South Africa’s BRIC membership and trade relationships with China, such geopolitical pressures may create indirect challenges. If Trump intensifies sanctions on crucial South African partners, this could disrupt trade networks, especially if China or other BRICS nations face more U.S. restrictions. Harris’s foreign policy approach is expected to be diplomatic. This would benefit South Africa by creating a more stable environment for its exports to the U.S. and China.
South Africa’s economy is deeply rooted in its natural resources, including gold, platinum, coal, iron ore, and chrome, making global commodity demand a critical factor.
Trump’s emphasis on U.S. energy independence and support for fossil fuels could maintain lower global oil prices, indirectly benefiting South Africa by reducing import costs. However, Trump’s trade tensions with China might also affect demand for key South African exports like iron ore and other minerals. As South Africa depends on commodity exports, especially to large markets like China, reduced demand could affect these sectors.
Prof Kedibone Phago, director of the NWU’s School for Government Studies, noted, “We have already noticed several of Donald Trump’s domestic and foreign policy positions that largely prioritises the US during his previous administration. He focused his attention on growing the US economy. This also occurred against a backdrop of several threats to reduce funding for international bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and similar arrangements. His focus on the US economy, immigration, conflicts, and climate change is expected to be more aggressive.”
Harris’s climate-focused policies may accelerate the transition to renewable energy, leaving South Africa vulnerable as a result of reduced demand for metals such as platinum, which is traditionally used in ‘dirty’ industries, and technologies such as internal combustion engines in motor vehicles. Furthermore, South Africa’s reliance on coal-powered electricity generation and poor environmental protection record could result in U.S. sanctions and restrictions. Harris’s green initiatives might also reduce global fossil fuel dependency, which could help stabilise oil prices, benefitting South Africa by reducing the cost of imports and improving its trade balance.